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        2018年3月30日上午9:30-11:00 路海昊:公司管治披露政策的經濟后果
        講座題目: Economic Consequences of Corporate Governance Disclosure: Evidence from the 2006 SEC Regulation on Related-Party Transactions
        主講人:路海昊 加拿大滑鐵盧大學會計與金融學院副教授
        主講人簡介:加拿大滑鐵盧大學會計與金融學院副教授,畢業于加拿大多倫多大學 (University of Toronto)會計學博士, 師從知名會計學家Ole-Kristian Hope。研究興趣包括資本市場,銀行信貸,信用評級,公司治理,關聯交易等實證研究。曾在Journal of Business Finance and Accounting期刊發表學術論文,并擔任Accounting Horizon、Journal of Corporate Finance和Contemporary Accounting Research期刊匿名審稿人。
        This paper examines the economic consequences of a 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation mandating public firms to disclose their governance policies on related-party transactions (hereafter RPTs). Employing hand-collected RPT data for S&P 1500 firms, I find that the initiation of RPT governance disclosure significantly reduces the occurrence of RPTs, suggesting an improvement in RPT governance. This reduction is more pronounced for firms with lower analyst coverage, weaker product-market competition, and lower institutional ownership. I also find that the disclosure effect is conditional on the types of RPTs and on the identities of the parties involved. Specifically, the disclosure effect concentrates on RPTs with the CEO, with the chairman of the board, and with directors, and on RPTs involving sales, leases, or loans, suggesting these transactions are more likely used for expropriation. Finally, I find that the disclosure of RPT governance reduces the implied costs of capital (ICC) associated with RPTs. I examine two possible mechanisms reducing the costs of capital and find that the governance channel is the main contributing factor over the information channel. My inferences are robust to the use of either the volume or amount of RPTs. Taken together, this study provides evidence about how disclosure on governance can enhance firms’ governance and about the real effects of the 2006 SEC’s regulation.